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Recent Decisions
MONOPOLIES - RESTRAINT OF TRADE - ASSOCIATIONS
AND CLUBS
Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 219 A.2d 635
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1966)
Historically, the courts have refused to compel a voluntary asso-
ciation1 to admit an individual into membership since it was felt that
membership is a privilege rather than a right Some of the more
recent cases, however, have found exceptions to the general rule;'
this trend is exemplified by Grillo v. Board of Realtors,4 in which
the Superior Court of New Jersey applied the exception to a unique
area of the economy.
The plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker, sought injunctive re-
lief against the defendant Board of Realtors, a private voluntary
association, because he had been denied membership in their multi-
ple listing system.' The plaintiff had submitted several applications
for membership but was rejected each time.7 The defendant Board,
which was made up of a great majority of the active real estate
brokers in its territory, made the multiple listings available only to
members of the Board. In its decision allowing the plaintiff in-
junctive relief, the court held that such a system, with its prohibi-
tions on the sale of multiple-listed property through nonmember
brokers, tended to stifle competition by preventing nonmember bro-
kers from effectively earning a livelihood and hence constituted an
unreasonable and illegal restraint upon trade in violation of the
common law.'
1 The word "association" is one of vague meaning, used to indicate a collection of per-
sons who have joined together with a definite purpose in mind. A "voluntary" associa-
non is one in which membership is a matter of choice. 6 AM. JuR. 2D Associations
and Clubs § 1 (1963).
2 See id. § 18.
3 E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
4 219 A.2d 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1966).
5 Under New Jersey state law, a license must be obtained prior to engaging in the
business of a real estate broker or salesman. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-1 ,(1963).
6 "Multiple listing" among real estate brokers is a system of listing properties for
sale by each real estate broker whereby they utilize a list which is available to all par-
ticipating brokers. When the properties are sold, the commissions are usually split in
agreed proportions between the brokers listing the properties and the brokers selling
them. WEBsTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961 ed.).
7 219 A.2d at 637.
8 Id. at 648.
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In order to reach the above decision, it was necessary for the
court first to determine that it, rather than the New Jersey Real
Estate Commission,' had jurisdiction. The court justified its primary
jurisdiction by stating that the questions of law and findings of fact
involved were of the type which did not require the specialized
knowledge of the state commission."0 However, it is submitted
that by so doing, the court assumed a fact that really did not exist.
It seems only logical that the New Jersey Real Estate Commission
has a more specialized knowledge of multiple listings and their
consequences than does the court. Thus, the court was obliged
to decide questions with which it was unfamiliar." It has also
been argued that the courts should not interfere with such asso-
ciations and boards, the rationale being that greater benefits will ac-
crue to the community if the boards are free to determine their own
policies.'" This argument is akin to the doctrine of laissez faire.
On the other hand, the court's jurisdiction could have been
justified easily by a consideration of the serious consequences of the
plaintiff's exclusion.'3 For example, while exclusion from a secret
society entails no social stigma, the skilled workman who is expelled
from his trade union, 4 the physician who is expelled from the medi-
cal association,' 5 or the broker who is expelled from the stock ex-
change 6 will thereafter find it very difficult to successfully earn a
living. Similarly, plaintiff's exclusion from membership in the
defendant Board would clearly interfere with his means of effec-
tively practicing his profession. Therefore, it is suggested that the
seriousness of the consequences alone would justify the court in ex-
ercising its jurisdiction. 7
More important, however, the court was faced with the crucial
issue of whether the combination constituted an unreasonable re-
9 This commission was established to investigate the actions of the licensed brokers
and to suspend or revoke licenses upon good cause. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:15-5,
-17,-18 (1963).
10 219 A.2d at 641.
11 See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv.
993, 1023-24 (1930).
121d. at 1027.
13 Id. at 1021-22.
14 E.g., Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Ad. 70 (1921).
15 E.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
(1961).
16 E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
17 After deciding that it had jurisdiction, the court determined that the plaintiff was
entitled to sue in his private capacity due to an appropriate coupling of "public and pri-
vate interests in the subject matter." 219 A.2d at 643.
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straint of trade 8 and was hence illegal. 9  The court answered this
question in the affirmative, relying upon several United States
Supreme Court decisions." The reason for the use of federal pre-
cedent in this state decision is that federal antitrust law, established
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,2 serves as a useful guide in
resolving state common law restraint of trade problems.2
Applying these decisions to the present factual situation, the
court concluded that a commitment by a member of the Board to
furnish information about property for sale only to fellow members
constituted an unreasonable combination in restraint of trade. As
it existed, the concerted refusal to deal with nonmembers was held
to be a per se violation.23 In addition, the danger exists that a non-
member, restricted by the defendant from obtaining and using its
18 The term "restraint of trade" is used in reference to combinations, acts, or prac-
tices which suppress competition. This is accomplished by interfering with the normal
production and supply of the commodities involved. The term also refers to contrac-
tual restrictions upon the right of a person to engage in a trade, business, or profession.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
19 219 A.2d at 644.
2 0 E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
2126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 2 Historically, there are two themes of antitrust law: the first is a prohibition of re-
straint of trade and the other is the "rule of reason" which limits the prohibition. These
two common law principles were incorporated by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat.
209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911), the Court said in explicit terms that the act pro-
hibited only contracts or acts which unreasonably restrained competition. With the
development of this "rule of reason" many defendants tried to justify their acts by alleg-
ing that the particular acts assailed were reasonable. The courts responded to these
attempts by developing the so-called "per se" violation. These are acts which because of
their pernicious effect on competition are prohibited by the antitrust laws regardless of
any asserted justification or alleged reasonablness. See Loevinger, The Rule of Reason
in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L REv. 23 (1964). The following agreements today are held
to be "per se" violations: (1) agreements not to compete which are not ancillary to a
legitimate contract, e.g., Norfolk So. Bus Corp. v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 159 F.2d
306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 827 (1947); (2) collusive price fixing, e.g., United
States v. Socony-Vacaum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); (3) agreements among com-
petitors to divide a market, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951); (4) group boycotts, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); (5) tying agreements used to foreclose competitors from
any substantial market, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); (6)
agreements for pooling of profits and losses by competitors, e.g., United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); (7) agreement among competitors to limit
the supply of a commodity, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940). For a more detailed discussion, see loevinger, supra.
23 219 A.2d at 644-45.
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listings, may be driven out of business.24 Furthermore, the court
correctly assumed that such combinations and their attendant restric-
tions create, in reality, an extra-governmental agency in the area of
real estate which the state has already pre-empted by statutory regu-
lation.2"
Because the concerted refusal to deal with nonmembers (i.e.,
group boycotting) is considered a per se violation,26 once a court
discovers the practice, the violation becomes automatic, and no in-
quiry into the purposes and intent of the combination is necessary.
The court, as in Grillo, need merely examine the bare facts of the
case to determine if a group boycott exists. The major criticism of
this approach is that nowhere in the opinion is the practice of
"group boycotting" defined and distinguished from other practices
of a monopolistic nature which for some reason might be considered
reasonable and hence lawful.
In all probability a majority of the other jurisdictions would
agree with the opinion of the court in the Grillo case. However, it
is suggested that there are at least eight factors concerning the ques-
tion of unreasonable restraint of trade which favor the defendant's
position and merit attention.
First, it can be asserted that the hypothesis upon which antitrust
law is predicated is that a restraint of trade is injurious to the pub-
lic. Our society has adopted the axiom that control of a market and
elimination of free competition is an evil detrimental to the econ-
omy.27 This reasoning is expressed in terms of protecting the public,
not the competitor. Therefore, by applying the above reasoning to
the facts of the subject case, the question of whether or not plaintiff
is able to earn a living in the real estate business is actually of little
significance in adjudicating the legality of the multiple listing sys-
tem. More important is the impact of multiple listing on the public
welfare. By way of conclusion, the court in the Grillo case stated:
There is good in the multiple listing system. It provides an
effective method for selling and buying properties. The seller
benefits because his property is exposed in a number of offices,
hence reaches a wider market in a shorter period of time. It is
also useful and convenient to the prospective buyer who is seeking
a house that will suit his needs and purse.28
24 d. at 646-47.
25Id. at 647-48.
26See note 22 supra.
27 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
28219 A.2d at 644.
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So with the benefit that multiple listing confers upon the public,
there should be some recognition of the fact that multiple listing, as
it existed in the Grillo case, is not necessarily an unreasonable re-
straint of trade to the detriment of the economy.
Second, nowhere in the court's opinion is there a definition of an
appropriate or relevant market which the defendant Board allegedly
monopolized. The plaintiff's chief allegation was that the multiple
listing arrangement effectively controlled the vast majority of list-
ings within the Board's territory.29 Actually, the court assumed that
the territory constituted a relevant market because of the per-
manent nature of the commodity involved (real estate). However,
it is quite obvious that many real estate brokers who are members of
the defendant Board would have listings and sales outside the geo-
graphical confines of the Board, presumably in areas serviced by
other multiple listing systems. The reason for this is that a listing
in one community might have little attraction to the populace of
that community, while the same listing might have a greater attrac-
tion to the residents of another community. Therefore, if realtors
who belong to the defendant Board have a larger geographic mar-
ket, so does the plaintiff. Consequently, the Board's territory is an
illusory and arbitrary market.
Third, there was an absence of any evidence tending to show
that the realtors of the defendant Board proportionately had either
more sales, more listings, or both as compared with nonmember
realtors in the same area. Furthermore, a leading decision in the
field of market monopoly held that "The percentage we have al-
ready mentioned - over ninety . . . is enough to constitute a
monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would
be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not."3 Therefore,
it is suggested that although it was ascertainable it still remains un-
known whether the multiple listings and sales constitute "sixty" or
"thirty-three" or an even smaller percentage of the "market."
Fourth, it should also be noted that there are many incidents of
direct sales taking place (from the seller to the purchaser without
the use of a broker). These transactions also involve potential
clients and are as important in determining market control as
are customers of the listed properties. Yet there is no mention of
this factor in the opinion.
Fifth, there was actually a great degree of internal competition
29Id. at 640.
30 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
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within the Board itself. Because the defendant Board was organized
as a nonprofit corporation,"' there was no sharing of profits or pros-
pects. Rather, remuneration was dependent upon services independ-
ently rendered." But even if one were to assume that there was no
internal competition, it appears that by enjoining the Board from
restricting membership and thereby permitting access to the multi-
ple listing by every real estate broker, the court may have created a
total monopoly.
Sixth, in the normal case where a restraint of trade is alleged,
defendants have usually managed to control the source of the
product so as to limit a competitor's ability to acquire and market
it.3 In the real estate brokerage business, however, the source of
the product certainly cannot be controlled by the broker. The sub-
ject matter of these transactions remains in a state of flux because
various persons are continually buying and selling different parcels
of land. Therefore, the plaintiff and all other brokers had an equal
opportunity to obtain listings. With this in mind, it would seem
that the degree of success attained by each broker depends entirely
upon his own initiative and resourcefulness and not upon whether
he is a member of a multiple listing system.34
Seventh, multiple listing certainly has no effect upon plaintiff's
ability to obtain his own listings. Due to the fact that he is dealing
with the public and marketing a product supplied by the public,
there is no reason why he could not freely advertise his listings and
circulate them in any manner he chooses. The defendants had in no
way interfered with this aspect of the plaintiff's occupation.
Eighth, the existence of the multiple listing merely offers alter-
native methods of service to the public. An example of one of
these additional methods would be the personal exclusive listing,
whereby a customer lists his property with a specific realtor who has
the exclusive right, for a designated period of time, to sell the cus-
tomer's property. The nature of this relationship enables the realtor
to provide service to his customer with a higher degree of personal
attention. Obviously, the Board's multiple listing does not preclude
the use or effectiveness of other forms of service.
31 219 A.2d at 637.
3 2 Id. at 651.
33 E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
34 This argument can be refuted, however, by the fact that a homeowner will usually
list his property with a multiple listing system, since it would provide him with a
wider buying market. Also, regardless of the initiative possessed by the sole realtor, it
is very difficult for him to compete with the high sales volume enjoyed by members of
multiple listing arrangements.
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Notwithstanding the various arguments of the defendant which
are stated above and which the court seemingly ignored, it would
seem that the court's decision was correct.35 Moreover, it seems
that the same result could have been reached on the grounds of
"state action." Because the court in the Grillo case utilized the
federal standards of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act36 as a guide for its
common law restraint of trade problems, it would have been logical
for it to apply guidelines for "state action" as established by certain
decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Under this theory
not only the defendant Board but also the state would have com-
mitted a wrongful act. Because the "due process" and "equal pro-
tection" clauses of the fourteenth amendment are directed towards
state activity, state licensing of real estate brokers," which is a suf-
ficient connection with the state to constitute "state action,"" must
conform to the dictates of that amendment. In Lombard v. Loui-
siana,4 a case concerned with discrimination in a restaurant licensed
by the state, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
This restaurant needs a permit from Louisiana to operate; and
during the existence of the license the State has broad powers of
visitation and control. This restaurant is thus an instrumentality
of the State since the State charges it with duties to the public
and supervises its performance.41
Thus, by analogy, the defendant Board's dealings could be con-
sidered state action. Furthermore, the fact that the defendant
Board excluded certain brokers, thereby interfering with a nonmem-
ber's opportunity to effectively earn a livelihood, amounted to a
partial revocation of his license,42 clearly a governmental function.43
This constitutes a second factor upon which "state action" could
have been based.44
35 See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
3626 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
37 E.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17 (1960); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-1 (1963).
39 See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1960).
40 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
41Id. at 282 (concurring opinion). (Footnotes omitted.)
42E.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
(1961).
43 There is an existing state statute which provides for the revocation of licenses.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:15-17, -18 (1963).
44See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) for examples of federal constitutional limitations which are applied to private
groups that exercise a governmental function.
1966]
